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Abstract. The Battle of the Sexes describes asymmetric conflicts in mating behavior of males and females.
Males can be philanderer or faithful, while females are either fast or coy, leading to a cyclic dynamics. The
adjusted replicator equation predicts stable coexistence of all four strategies. In this situation, we consider
the effects of fluctuations stemming from a finite population size. We show that they unavoidably lead to
extinction of two strategies in the population. However, the typical time until extinction occurs strongly
prolongs with increasing system size. In the meantime, a quasi-stationary probability distribution forms
that is anomalously flat in the vicinity of the coexistence state. This behavior originates in a vanishing
linear deterministic drift near the fixed point. We provide numerical data as well as an analytical approach
to the mean extinction time and the quasi-stationary probability distribution.
PACS. 87.23.-n Ecology and evolution – 05.40.-a Fluctuation phenomena, random processes, noise, and
Brownian motion – 02.50.Ey Stochastic processes – 05.10.Gg Stochastic analysis methods (Fokker-Planck,
Langevin, etc.)
1 Introduction
Evolutionary game theory [1,2,3] describes the coevolu-
tion of different interacting species. The latter act accord-
ing to a certain strategy, and the success of each strat-
egy depends on the behavior of the other species. In this
way, the fitness of each individual is frequency dependent;
it changes upon altering the abundances of the differ-
ent species in the total population. The classical formu-
lation of such evolutionary games uses ordinary differen-
tial equations (replicator equations) [1,2]. However, in real
populations fluctuations occur, stemming, e.g., from the
discreteness of individuals, the random character of the
interactions or spatial degrees of freedom. Incorporating
such stochastic effects constitutes an important issue that
currently receives much attention [4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. In the
simplest scenario, fluctuations stem only from finite pop-
ulation sizes, while spatial structure or other correlations
among individuals may be neglected. This situation arises
when populations are well-mixed, i.e. individuals interact
randomly with each other.
Here, we consider the influence of finite-size fluctua-
tions on the dynamics of the bimatrix game Battle of the
Sexes. The latter was first introduced by Dawkin [11], and
serves as a model for describing different mating behaviors
of males and females. Both males and females spread their
genes if they get as many offspring as possible. However,
an offspring causes some cost, and so every individual tries
to shift this cost to the other mating partner, resulting in
non-trivial competitions. As an example, this dynamics
has been applied to insect populations [12]. More gener-
ally, the Battle of the Sexes serves as an example of a
intriguing class of asymmetric games, often also described
by the game “matching pennies” [2,13]. This class is char-
acterized by lack of pure Nash-equilibria, accompanied by
cyclic behavior and interesting stability properties of an
emerging internal fixed point.
In the simplest formulation of the Battle of the Sexes,
both males (♂) and females (♀) can choose between two
alternative strategies. Females either belong to the fast fe-
males, strategy ♀A, or to the coy females, strategy ♀B. The
latter insist on a long courtship (implying a certain cost
for both partners, as they wait for mating), opposed to
fast females, while both care for their offspring (which also
bears some cost). The male subpopulation is constituted
of philanderers, strategy ♂A, or faithful males, strategy
♂B. Philanderers are not prepared to engage in a long
courtship, and do not care for their offspring. In contrast,
faithful males do, if necessary, engage in courtship as well
as in raising the offspring. Note that different strategies
apply to the two subpopulations, the game is asymmetric.
The benefits and costs of the different strategies depend
on the mating partner, and are usually encoded in a pay-
off matrix. For the Battle of the Sexes, Dawkin [11] has
proposed the following payoffs:
fast: ♀A coy: ♀B
philanderer: ♂A (15,−5) (0, 5)
faithful: ♂B (5, 0) (2, 2)
Hereby, the first term within the brackets encodes the pay-
off of males, and the second the one of females. For exam-
ple, if a philanderer meets a fast female, the philanderer
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gains the high payoff 15 (he has offspring without caring
for it), while the fast female gets payoff −5 (although hav-
ing spread her genes, she must raise the offspring herself).
The qualitative behavior of the dynamics can be seen
as follows. Consider a situation with almost only fast fe-
males and philanderers, the few coy females will then take
over the female subpopulation since fast females have a
disadvantage against philanderers (they must raise the off-
spring themselves as the males leave after mating). How-
ever, if there are many coy females, faithful males are bet-
ter off since fast females are rare and philanderers have
problems finding mating partners. If there are again many
faithful males, fast females have an advantage compared
to coy ones since the risk of getting a philanderer is low
and they safe the cost of waiting for mating. Philanderers,
facing a high fraction of fast females, are now again in a
favorable position, and edge out faithful males. Hence, the
whole dynamics is cyclic, similar to the non-hierarchical
competition encountered in the rock-paper-scissors game [1,
2,8,10,14].
The ecologically most relevant question in this compe-
tition is whether all strategies can coexist (probably with
oscillating frequencies) in a stable manner, such that the
system is diverse, or whether some strategies go extinct,
and only one pair of strategies survives. We show in the
following that the answer is drastically influenced by the
finite sizes of the populations. If populations are large, the
dynamics is close to the deterministic one. In this limit, it
has been shown in [1,13] that all strategies coexist. The
replicator equation predicts neutrally stable oscillations,
and the adjusted replicator equation weakly damped ones.
However, it has already been outlined in [6] that finite-size
fluctuations may invalidate this result.
Here, we present a thorough analysis of such stochas-
tic effects in the Battle of the Sexes. Within a proper de-
scription of the system in terms of a Fokker-Planck equa-
tion, we show that extinction indeed occurs eventually,
although the mean waiting time can be extremely long.
Indeed, the latter increases strongly with growing popula-
tion size. An intermediate probability distribution corre-
sponding to coexistence of all strategies forms, which we
compute analytically as well as by stochastic simulations.
We find anomalous behavior; the distribution is flat over
a wide range of states (corresponding to coexistence), and
then strongly decays.
This paper is organized as follows: In the next sec-
tion, we introduce the stochastic version of the Battle
of the Sexes and present the master equation of the dis-
crete stochastic process. In Section 3 we consider the de-
terministic limit of the stochastic model, and recover ad-
justed replicator equations. We analyze the deterministic
dynamics and the stability of an interior coexistence fixed
point, which gives us hints on the behavior of the stochas-
tic model discussed in Sec. 4. There, finite-size fluctua-
tions are included into the description. We present the
continuum approximation of the stochastic process by a
Fokker-Planck equation and show that a quasi-stationary
distribution forms. In Section 5 we consider the mean ex-
tinction time T , being the mean time until two strategies
go extinct. In the last Section we summarize our findings
and present a brief conclusion.
2 Stochastic model
In this Section we setup a simple stochastic model for
describing the cyclic dynamics of the Battle of the Sexes
in a population of finite size. As we consider a well-mixed
situation, the system’s state is entirely determined by the
number of individuals using the four different strategies.
We denote by N♂A and N
♂
B the number of males using
strategy ♂A resp. ♂B; analogously, N
♀
A and N
♀
B encode
the number of females of strategy ♂A resp. ♂B.
For the stochastic dynamics, we consider a Moran pro-
cess [15,16] (equivalent to urn models [8,17]). In this frame-
work, the number of males and females are chosen to be
equal and remain constant in time, N♀ = N♂ ≡ N . Then
we may, for example, describe the current state of the sys-
tem by the frequencies x of philanderers, x = N♂A /N , and
the abundance y of fast females, y = N
♀
A/N . The frequen-
cies of faithful males and coy females follow as 1− x and
1 − y. We thus encounter a two-dimensional state space.
The dynamics is defined by selection and reproduction
events: At each update-step, one individual is selected for
reproduction, proportional to its fitness (which will be in-
troduced below), while another (randomly chosen) indi-
vidual of the same subpopulation is replaced.
Introducing the probability P (x, t) that the system is
in state x = (x, y) at time t, we can write down a master
equation for the stochastic (Markov) process [18,19],
∂tP (x, t) =
∑
x
′
[Γx′→xP (x
′, t)− Γx→x′P (x, t)] . (1)
Hereby, Γx′→x denotes the transition rate from state x
to a new state x′. In our case, the states can only differ
by 1/N , as only a single individual is replaced at each
step. For example, a philanderer (♂A) can be replaced
by a faithful male (♂B); we denote the corresponding
rate by Γ♂A→B (x) if the system’s state was initially x.
Analogously, rates Γ♂B→A (x), Γ
♀
A→B (x) and Γ
♀
B→A (x)
appear. These transition rates involve the individuals’ fit-
ness, which we introduce in the following.
Denote by f♂A the fitness of philanderers, and by f
♂
B ,
f
♀
A , f
♀
B the ones of faithful males, fast females, and coy
ones, respectively. They follow from a payoff matrix as
the one presented in the introduction (to be described be-
low). For the rates, as an example, consider the probability
Γ♂A→B (x) for replacing a philanderer by a faithful male. It
is given by the fitness f♂B of the latter (normalized by the
average fitness denoted as φ♂), multiplied by the proba-
bility x(1−x) of selecting a faithful male for reproduction
and a philanderer for replacement. Thus, we encounter
Γ♂A→B (x) =
f♂
B
φ♂
x(1 − x). Analogously, the other transi-
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tion rates are found, and altogether, we obtain
Γ♂B→A =
f♂
A
φ♂
x(1 − x) , Γ♂A→B =
f♂B
φ♂
x(1 − x) ,
Γ
♀
B→A =
f
♀
A
φ♀
y(1− y) , Γ♀A→B =
f
♀
B
φ♀
y(1− y) . (2)
Hereby, φ♀ denotes the average fitness of females, and is
given by φ♀ = f
♀
Ay + f
♀
B(1 − y), while the average fit-
ness of males reads φ♂ = f♂A x + f
♂
B (1 − x). The rate
for a transition within a given subpopulation depends on
the frequencies of strategies there, as well as on the abun-
dances of the different strategies of the other subpopula-
tion, entering via the fitness functions, as we show in the
following.
As described in the introduction, fitness is conveniently
encoded in a payoff matrix. Here, we consider the most
symmetric formulation of the Battle of the Sexes, where
the payoffs are given by
fast: ♀A coy: ♀B
philanderer: ♂A (1,−1) (−1, 1)
faithful: ♂B (−1, 1) (1,−1)
For example, if a philanderer meets a fast female, the phi-
landerer gains payoff 1, while the fast female gets payoff
−1.
For the fitness of one individual, we consider a back-
ground fitness of 1 − ω, where the (small) parameter ω
is referred to as selection strength. The fitness stemming
from the individuals’ interactions, given by the payoff ma-
trix, is multiplied by ω, and added. For vanishing selection
strength, ω = 0, the game is purely neutral, there is no fre-
quency dependent fitness at all. Increasing ω, the interac-
tions between the individuals and therefore the frequency
dependent dynamics becomes more and more important.
For specificity, in our stochastic simulations presented be-
low, we used ω = 0.5.
In this formulation, the fitness of a philanderer is f♂A =
1 − ω + ω [y − (1 − y)], as he encounters a fast female at
probability y and a coy one with a probability 1−y. Simi-
larly, faithful males gain a payoff f♂B = 1−ω+ω (1− 2y),
fast females earn f
♀
A = 1 − ω + ω (1− 2x), and coy ones
f
♀
B = 1− ω + ω (2x− 1).
3 Deterministic dynamics
To gain a first intuitive understanding of the system’s be-
havior, we start our discussion with the deterministic dy-
namics, which is ensued in the limit of infinite population
size, N →∞. In this asymptotic limit, the state space be-
comes continuous: the frequencies of philanderers, x, and
of fast females, y, can take any value in the interval [0, 1].
The deterministic dynamics describes the time-evolution
of these frequencies in terms of ordinary differential equa-
tions (ODE). The latter are obtained from the underly-
ing stochastic process by consideration of the frequencies’
mean values. In addition, a mean-field assumption (which
is justified for well-mixed populations) factorizes higher
moments of the probability distribution, yielding ODE
for the first moments. For the Moran process, which we
consider, they are given by the adjusted replicator equa-
tions [6] for the (mean) frequencies x and y, we sketch
its derivation in the following. According to the Moran
process introduced above, the time evolution of the mean
fraction of philanderers is given by
x(t+ δt) = x(t) +
f♂A
φ♂
x(1− x)δt − f
♂
B
φ♂
x(1− x)δt. (3)
Here, we have chosen the time-scale such that N update
steps (one generation) occur in one time-unit. Together
with an analogous equation for the time evolution of the
females’ frequencies, we obtain
∂tx =
f♂A − φ♂
φ♂
x = 2ω˜
x(1 − x)(2y − 1)
1 + ω˜ (2y − 1) (2x− 1) ,
∂ty =
f
♀
A − φ♀
φ♀
y = −2ω˜ y(1− y)(2x− 1)
1− ω˜ (2x− 1) (2y − 1) , (4)
where we introduced ω˜ = ω1−ω to simplify the expressions.
We recover the well known adjusted replicator equations of
a bimatrix game [2,20]. The success of a strategy depends
on its fitness compared to the average one. For example,
the sign of f♂A − φ♂ determines if the fraction of philan-
derers in the male subpopulation grows or decreases.
Let us analyze the deterministic system described by
Eqs. (4) in more detail. There are four trivial fixed points,
namely the four corners of the phase space. They corre-
spond to the survival of only one pair of strategies, and
are given by (x∗1, y
∗
1) = (0, 0) (only faithful males and coy
females), (x∗2, y
∗
2) = (0, 1) (only faithful males and fast
females), (x∗3, y
∗
3) = (1, 0)(only philanderers and coy fe-
males), and (x∗4, y
∗
4) = (1, 1) (only philanderers and fast
females). All these fixed points are saddle points. In ad-
dition, one fixed point resides in the interior of the phase
space, at a position x∗ = y∗ = 1/2. At this coexistence
fixed point, all strategies are present at equal frequencies.
The coexistence fixed point is globally stable, which
can be shown using the following Lyapunov function:
H = −x · (1− x) · y · (1− y) (5)
= −
(
1
4
− x˜2
)(
1
4
− y˜2
)
.
Hereby, in the second line, we have introduced new coor-
dinates x˜, y˜ that originate in the coexistence fixed point,
x˜ = x− 1
2
, y˜ = y − 1
2
.
In these coordinates, the temporal derivative of H is given
by
∂tH = −
ω˜2x˜2y˜24
(
1− 4x˜2) (1− 4y˜2)
(1− ω˜)2 − (4ω˜x˜y˜)2 , (6)
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which is negative on the whole phase space (except for
the boundaries and the coexistence fixed point, where it
vanishes). As H has its minimum at the coexistence fixed
point, the latter is globally stable. In particular, it is at-
tractive for every state that is not located at the bound-
aries.
Performing a Taylor expansion of the Eqs. (4) around
the fixed point yields
∂tx˜ = ω˜y˜ − 4ω˜x˜2y˜ − 4ω˜2x˜y˜2 +O
(
x˜2, y˜2
)
,
∂ty˜ = −ω˜x˜− 4ω˜2x˜2y˜ + 4ω˜x˜y˜2 +O
(
x˜2, y˜2
)
. (7)
The dynamics resulting from these equations becomes most
evident upon introducing polar coordinates (r, φ) given by
x˜ = r cosφ, and y˜ = r sinφ. (8)
r denotes the distance to the coexistence fixed point. Then,
the replicator dynamics is given by
∂tr = −ω˜r3 [ω˜(1 − cos 4φ) + sin 4φ] ,
∂tφ = −ω˜ + ω˜r2 [(1− cos 4φ)− ω˜ sin 4φ]). (9)
We observe the linear order to predict neutrally stable
cycling around the fixed point at frequency ω˜. Therefore,
this behavior occurs asymptotically when approaching the
coexistence fixed point. At further distance, higher orders
matter. As can be seen, the third order terms in ∂tr yield
a drift towards the fixed point1. The latter is thus stable,
in agreement with the previous considerations based on
the Lyapunov function.
To summarize, although the coexistence fixed point
is globally stable, the linear drift in its vicinity vanishes.
Therefore, close to the fixed point, only cyclic motion
around it remains. To illustrate this behavior, in Fig. 1, we
show a trajectory (black solid line) emerging as solution
of the adjusted replicator equation when starting near the
boundary of the phase space. Although the drift towards
the interior fixed point is strong close to the boundary,
it is seen to vanish when the fixed point is approached.
There, the cyclic behavior dominates. As an example for
the behavior of the finite system (discussed in the next
Section), we also show a stochastic trajectory (red line) in
Fig. 1. Starting in the vicinity of the boundary, it follows
closely the deterministic solution. The deterministic drift
is strong, and fluctuations have only a minor influence.
This changes when the fixed point is approached. There,
due to the vanishing deterministic drift towards the fixed
point, fluctuations dominate. In the next Section, we show
how this induces intriguing behavior.
4 Stochastic description
Stochasticity has an important impact in this model due
to the existence of absorbing boundaries. Namely, if one
1 The average of the angle-dependent terms in ∂tr along
one cycle around the fixed point vanishes, the remaining term
yields a drift into the coexistence fixed point.
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Fig. 1. Phase space and dynamics of the Battle of the Sexes.
The deterministic dynamics exhibits a coexistence fixed point
at x∗ = y∗ = 1
2
. The black solid line shows a deterministic tra-
jectory. Starting at a fraction of philanders of x = 0.01 and a
fraction of fast females given by y = 0.5, the system oscillates
according to the cyclic dynamics. The coexistence fixed point
is approached but the drift towards it is getting very weak in
its vicinity. Indeed, the linear order of the drift vanishes at
the fixed point, and only third order terms render it stable.
A realization of the stochastic process (starting at the same
initial state; the system size is N = 500) is shown in red. As
can be seen, at the beginning, the realization follows the de-
terministic trajectory. The drift towards the coexistence fixed
point dominates the behavior, fluctuations are unimportant.
This changes at closer distance to the coexistence fixed point,
where the deterministic drift is lower and fluctuations have a
stronger impact.
strategy has gone extinct (i.e. the system has reached
the boundary of the phase space), this strategy can no
longer give rise to an offspring, and therefore cannot re-
cover again. Thus, the boundaries are absorbing, and once
the system has reached them, the cyclic dynamics drives
it into a state where only one pair of strategies is present
(the corners of the phase space). The existence of fluctu-
ations in the system ensures that (maybe after very long
waiting time) the absorbing boundary is reached. Thus,
extinction unavoidably occurs. However, due to the de-
terministic drift towards the coexistence fixed point, the
mean waiting time T is expected to be long for large sys-
tems. Indeed, in the next Section, we will show that T
strongly prolongs with increasing population size.
Consider a situation where the system is initially at
the coexistence fixed point (the probability distribution
is, initially, a delta peak). The distribution will broaden
in time, counteracted by deterministic third-order terms,
c.f. Fig. 2. When this deterministic drift balances the fluc-
tuations, an intermediate (quasi-stationary) probability
distribution forms (Fig. 3). As the initial spreading is
induced by fluctuations, the intermediate distribution is
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Fig. 2. The approach of a quasi-stationary distribution.
Stochastic simulations (for a system size N = 100) show that,
starting at an initial delta peak at the coexistence fixed point,
a quasi-stationary distribution is reached, at a time around
t = 50. Then, it remains unchanged for a long time (we have
followed it up to a time t = 100). During this time, extinction
events have occurred only very rarely (until t = 100, less then
0.1% of the realizations have reached the boundaries). We ob-
serve the quasi-stationary distribution to be almost flat in the
vicinity of the reactive fixed point.
expected to form around a time proportional to the sys-
tem size N [8]. (In this section we show that it obeys
non-gaussian behavior, due to the vanishing linear drift.)
At much later times, this distribution decays as, due to
fluctuations, the probability increases that the system has
eventually reached the absorbing boundaries. We find the
typical extinction time T to diverge exponentially in the
system size, T ∼ exp(N).
In this Section we describe the quasi-stationary distri-
bution analytically; the mean extinction time is considered
in the next Section. To take the stochasticity of the Moran
process into account, we chose a continuous diffusion-like
description. Namely, we use a Fokker-Planck equation ob-
tained via a Kramers-Moyal expansion (which may be seen
as an expansion in the system size) of the master equa-
tion (1), see , e.g., Ref. [21]. The resulting Fokker-Planck
equation describes the time evolution of the probability
P (x, t) that the system is in state x = (x, y) at time t,
and reads
∂tP (x, t) = −
∑
i
∂i [αi(x, t)P (x, t)]
+
1
2
∑
i,j
∂i∂j [βijP (x, t)] . (10)
The summation is over the phase space coordinates x and
y. The drift coefficients αi follow from the adjusted repli-
cator equations (4); αx = ∂tx and αy = ∂ty. The coef-
ficients of the diffusion matrix (βij) encode fluctuations
 0
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µFig. 3. The quasi-stationary distribution, for a system size
N = 100. It is concentrated in the middle of the phase space,
having almost flat behavior there. Towards the boundaries, it
rapidly decreases, until nearly vanishing. The probability dis-
tribution is symmetric under rotation of pi/2, as follows also
from the symmetric formulation of the game (symmetric pay-
off matrix). Close to the fixed point, it asymptotically obeys a
polar symmetry. For large system size, the relevant part of the
quasi-stationary distribution is located close enough around
the fixed point. In this regime, the approximation by an angu-
lar independent Fokker-Planck equation is valid.
and are given by
βxx =
1
N
(
f♂A
φ♂
x(1 − x) + f
♂
B
φ♂
(1− x)x
)
,
βyy =
1
N
(
f
♀
A
φ♀
y(1− y) + f
♀
B
φ♀
(1− y)y
)
,
βxy = βyx = 0. (11)
The diffusion matrix (βij) is diagonal, as can be under-
stood as follows: Each update process is only acting on one
subpopulation, such that fluctuations between the sub-
populations do not form. For each subpopulation, a pro-
cess leading to an increase or decrease of one strategy in-
creases the fluctuations, therefore, for example, βxx is the
sum of the probability for an increase of the philanderers
and for an increase of the faithful males.
To proceed, we further employ van Kampens linear
noise approximation [19]. We assume a constant diffu-
sion matrix with the values at the coexistence fixed point,
βij(x) ≈ βij(x∗). In addition, as done above in the de-
terministic description, we approximate the drift term up
to third order around the coexistence fixed point and use
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polar coordinates. The Fokker Planck equation turns into
∂tP (r, φ, t) = ω˜∂φP (r, φ, t) + 4ω˜
2r2P (r, φ, t)
+ ω˜r3 [ω˜ (1− cos 4φ) + sin 4φ] ∂rP (r, φ, t)
+ ω˜r3 [ω˜ sin 4φ− (1− cos 4φ)] ∂φP (r, φ, t)
+
1
2N
△r P (r, φ, t), (12)
where △r denotes the Laplacian in polar coordinates.
As can be seen from Fig. 1 as well as from Eqs. (9), in the
vicinity of the coexistence fixed point, the system obeys
a polar symmetry. Therefore, we solve the Fokker-Planck
equation within a radial approximation around the fixed
point by replacing every angle-dependent term by its mean
value, for example 〈sinφ〉φ = 0. This is justified as close
to the fixed point, the system performs many oscillations
with only weak drift into the fixed point. The drift may
therefore be approximated by its mean value on a given
cycle. With P˜ (r) = r · P (r, t) it follows:
∂tP˜ (r, t) = ∂r
[(
ω˜2r3 − 1
2N
1
r
)
P˜ (r, t)
]
+
1
2N
∂2r P˜ (r, t) ,
= −∂r
[
αrP˜ (r, t)
]
+
1
2
βr∂
2
r P˜ (r, t) . (13)
We encounter a one-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation.
The dynamics takes place in an effective potential U =
1
4 ω˜
2r4− 12N ln(r), with αr = −∂rU(r). Standard diffusion,
given by the constant fluctuation term βr =
1
N , occurs.
With the help of this approximation we can now calculate
the quasi stationary distribution defined by ∂tP (r, t) = 0.
For large enough systems, the distribution is centered at
the fixed point, see Fig. 3, nearly vanishing at the bound-
aries. We therefore neglect the absorbing boundaries of the
phase space, and use P (∞, t) = 0 as boundary condition.
The radial quasi-stationary distribution then reads
P (r) =
2d
pi
3
2
exp
(−dr4) , (14)
with d = ω˜
2N
2 . Hereby, r is the distance to the coexistence
fixed point.
We have compared this analytical finding to stochastic
simulations, see Fig. 4. Both agree excellently and thereby
the approximation by an angle independent probability
distribution is confirmed.
This anomalous probability distribution is a result of
the weak deterministic drift towards the boundaries. In-
deed, a linearly stable fixed point leads to a (standard)
gaussian distribution, with a standard deviation that de-
creases asN−1/2 in the system sizeN , confer to an Ornstein-
Uhlenbeck-process [18,19]. In our case, the linear drift at
the fixed point vanishes, consequently, the resulting proba-
bility distribution is almost flat there. At larger distance to
the fixed point, third order terms become important, and
cause a sudden decrease of the probability; a non-gaussian
distribution forms. Its width, encoded by the parameter
d−1/4, still decreases with increasing system size N , al-
though weaker than in a gaussian distribution, namely
only as N−1/4. This behavior universally arises when a
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Fig. 4. Stochastic simulations of the Battle of the Sexes. Nu-
merical data for the radial quasi-stationary probability distri-
bution are shown. They confirm the analytical prediction of
an exp(−dr4)-distribution (solid lines). With increasing sys-
tem size N , the distribution is more and more centered around
the fixed point. In the vicinity of the latter, the distribution is
nearly flat, but it falls rapidly to zero at a larger distance.
fixed point is neutrally stable to linear order, but stabi-
lized by third order terms, and therefore characterizes this
class of systems.
5 Extinction time
In the previous section, we have described the emergence
of an intermediate quasi-stationary probability distribu-
tion on time scales proportional to the system size. How-
ever, we have already pointed out that, on much longer
time scales, this distribution eventually decays, and only
one pair of strategies survives (in our model, due to the
symmetric formulation, all corners of the phase space may
be reached at equal probabilities). In this section, we an-
alyze the time scale needed for extinction. In particular,
we show that it diverges exponentially in the system size
N .
Consider the mean time T (x, y) it takes until the ab-
sorbing boundaries are reached if starting at a state (x, y)
at time t = 0. For its calculation, we use again the con-
tinuous approximation of the stochastic process by the
Fokker-Planck equation (10) introduced above. Also, we
employ the angular symmetric approximation to obtain
the one-dimensional Fokker-Planck equation (13). In this
setting, calculating the extinction time is a first-passage
time problem in one dimension with an absorbing bound-
ary at a radius rexit. We are interested in the asymptotic
limit of a large system size, and for the scaling behavior
of T , the explicit value of rexit will turn out be unim-
portant. We solve the first-passage problem with the help
of the backward Kolmogorov equation [18,22]. Thereby,
the mean extinction time is given by the solution of the
following equation[
αr(r)∂r +
1
2
βr(r)∂
2
r
]
T (r) = −1, (15)
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with appropriate boundary conditions. The variable r now
denotes the starting point, at time t = 0. The general
solution of this problem for one reflecting (r = 0) and one
absorbing boundary (r = rexit) is given by
T = 2
∫ rexit
r
dy
Ψ(y)
∫ y
0
Ψ(z)
βr
dz . (16)
Hereby, Ψ(z) = exp
[∫ z
0 dz
′ 2αr(z
′)
βr
]
, and is computed as
Ψ(z) = z exp
(
−Nω˜
2
2
z4
)
. (17)
We consider the mean extinction time when starting at the
coexistence fixed point, T = T (r = 0). Then, the integrals
in Eq. (16) are solved by a hypergeometric series:
T =
N
√
pi
2
r2exitF{1/2,1;3/2,3/2}
(
Nω˜2
2
r4exit
)
. (18)
Hereby, the hypergeometric series is defined as
F{a1,a2;b1,b2} (z) =
∞∑
k=0
Γ (a1 + k)Γ (a2 + k)
Γ (a1)Γ (a2)
×
Γ (b1)Γ (b2)
Γ (b1 + k)Γ (b2 + k)
zk
k!
. (19)
Equation (18) yields an analytical expression for the mean
extinction time. In the asymptotic limit of infinite sys-
tem size N , it turns out that T diverges exponentially,
T ∼ N−1/2 exp(N). Namely, an asymptotic expansion
of the hypergeometric series for large arguments yields
F{a1,a2;b1,b2} (z) ∼ za1+a2−b1−b2 exp(z), see, e.g., [23]. For
the dependence of the mean extinction time T on N , this
implies T ∼ N ×Na1+a2−b1−b2 exp(N) = N−1/2 exp(N).
In Fig. 5 the analytical prediction of the extinction
time as well as stochastic simulations are shown. Hereby,
excellent agreement is found for rexit = 0.70. This value
lies in between the minimal possible exit radius, rminexit =
0.5, and the maximal possible one (the distance from the
coexistence fixed point to one corner), rmaxexit = 1/
√
2. In
addition, we have adjusted a constant factor of 0.28, tak-
ing nonlinearities into account2.
6 Conclusions
In this article, we have considered the influence of finite-
size fluctuations on the coexistence of different strategies
in the Battle of the Sexes. The deterministic dynamics, de-
scribed by adjusted replicator equations, predicts a coex-
istence fixed point which is stable (in contrast to the stan-
dard replicator dynamics considered in [13], which yields
2 By assuming a constant fluctuation term and approximat-
ing the deterministic drift term up to third order we have ne-
glected higher nonlinearities. These higher order terms do not
change the characteristic behavior of the extinction time but
lead to an additional factor (in our case 0.28), a similar exam-
ple is considered in [24].
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Fig. 5. The mean extinction time T : Stochastic simulations
(circles) show that T increases exponentially with increasing
system size N . This originates in finite-size fluctuations that,
with larger system size, become weaker and weaker compared
to the deterministic drift towards the coexistence fixed point.
The analytical approximation, given by Eq. (18), is shown as
a solid line and agrees very well with the numerical data. We
have chosen an exit radius of rexit = 0.70, and adjusted an
additional factor of 0.28, taking nonlinearities into account.
neutrally stable oscillations). However, the linear part of
the deterministic drift towards the coexistence fixed point
vanishes, stability is only induced by third order terms. We
have shown how this behavior, in the presence of finite-
size fluctuations that compete with the deterministic drift,
induces a non-gaussian probability distribution, propor-
tional to exp(−r4) around the fixed point. Namely, as the
drift vanishes in the vicinity of the coexistence fixed point,
fluctuations effect the system unopposed and induce a
flat distribution there. Further away from the fixed point,
third order terms of the deterministic drift dominate and
lead to a sudden decrease of the probability distribution.
We have found this probability distribution to be only
intermediate. Namely, due to the presence of absorbing
boundaries, extinction of two strategies eventually occurs.
We have computed the mean time for extinction, and
found that it increases exponentially in the system size
N . Thus, for large systems, the mean extinction time is
extremely long, and the quasi-stationary probability dis-
tribution very long-lived. This behavior originates in the
1/N decay of the finite-size fluctuations, rendering the de-
terministic drift dominant for large system sizes. On time-
scales below the mean extinction time, which may be the
ecologically relevant ones (see, e.g., the discussion in [25,
26]), coexistence is thus stable. Indeed, in Ref. [14] a def-
inition of stability/instability of coexistence in stochastic
systems based on time-scales has been proposed; within
this classification, the stochastic Battle of the Sexes an-
alyzed in the present work belongs to the stable regime.
We hope that, in such a more general context, our work
contributes to the understanding of ecological diversity in
the interplay with fluctuations and time-scales.
Although we have, for specificity, considered a sym-
metric formulation of the Battle of the Sexes, on a quali-
8 Jonas Cremer et al.: Anomalous finite-size effects in the Battle of the Sexes
tative level, our results generalize to less symmetric cases.
Indeed, as long as the payoff matrix belongs to the class of
the game “matching pennies”, its precise entries have only
minor influence. The deterministic (adjusted replicator)
equations obey a cyclic dynamics, with an internal fixed
point that is neutrally stable to first order, while higher
orders yield a drift towards it. In this situation, finite-size
fluctuations cause the behavior described above - extinc-
tion on an exponentially diverging time-scale, with an in-
termediate anomalous probability distribution. Consider-
ing situations where individuals are spatially arranged [10,
14,27] or interact with each other according to network
structures (see e.g. [9,10,28]), one may speculate that the
intriguing dynamics of this class of games may lead to
fruitful further insight into the role of fluctuations and
correlations on ecosystems diversity.
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